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Abstract:  
This article experimentally examines voluntary contributions when group members’ 
marginal returns to the public good vary. The experiment implements two marginal 
return types, low and high, and uses the information that members have about the 
heterogeneity to identify the applied contribution norm. We find that norms vary with the 
information environment. If agents are aware of the heterogeneity, contributions 
increase in general. However, high types contribute more than low types when 
contributions can be linked to the type of the donor but contribute less otherwise. Low 
types, on the other hand, contributes more than high types when group members are 
aware of the heterogeneity but contributions cannot be linked to types. Our results 
underline the importance of the information structure when persons with different 
abilities contribute to a joint project, as in the context of teamwork or charitable giving. 
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1 Introduction
People who contribute to public goods or to common projects are, generally
speaking, not alike. They diﬀer, for instance, in their talents, skills, and
qualiﬁcations. In some cases, heterogeneous abilities are even necessary to
achieve a common goal. Naturally, the question arises of how group het-
erogeneity aﬀects contributions to joint projects. This article examines the
voluntary contribution behaviors of individuals with heterogeneous abilities
using laboratory experiments.
Diﬀerences in individual capacities within a group, e.g., between citizens
in a society or team members, might stimulate voluntary contributions from
those whose special abilities are desperately needed. For instance, after
the devastating Kobe earthquake in Japan in 1995, local transportation
systems in the town of Kobe were paralyzed. Bicycling became a vital means
of transportation. The serious problem then became that many bicycles
broke and were left unrepaired due to a lack of the necessary equipment
and expertise to ﬁx the damage. To help the people in Kobe, a number of
bicycle enthusiasts from all over Japan came to Kobe voluntarily and oﬀered
much-needed assistance with repairing the broken bicycles.
On the other hand, heterogeneous abilities can become an obstacle when
soliciting eﬀort to accomplish common projects, as exempliﬁed by the legal
dispute among musicians in the Beethoven Orchestra in Bonn. The musi-
cians cooperating to perform a common musical program are heterogeneous
with respect to many factors, including the instruments they play, the (num-
ber of) notes they play during a given piece of music, and the amount of
time they must spend practicing in joint rehearsals before a performance.
However, under the unionized contracts of orchestra musicians in Germany,
all orchestra members are guaranteed equal payment regardless of the par-
ticular instrument they play. In March 2004, the violinists of the Beethoven
Orchestra demanded higher pay on the grounds that they have to rehearse
more than musicians playing other instruments.1 The other musicians, par-
ticularly soloists, argued that they were subject to more pressure than the
violinists, so receiving the same pay for less rehearsal time seemed to be
1The request was mainly based on the opportunity cost argument, namely that the
additional free time that other musicians enjoy can be used to augment their monthly
wages by teaching or performing elsewhere.
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justiﬁed.2
The above examples capture two general considerations relevant to the
voluntary contribution behavior of individuals with heterogeneous abilities.
On one hand, heterogeneity between group members might evoke diﬀerent
contribution norms. On the other hand, the appropriate contribution norm
may depend on the context in which the heterogeneity is perceived. In the
case of the Kobe earthquake, the norm called for help from persons who were
knowledgable about bicycle repair. The conﬂicting views between soloists
and violinists in the Bonn orchestra suggest that violinists consider equal re-
muneration of nominal work hours to be an appropriate norm, while soloists
seem to favor remuneration according to eﬀective contribution, which takes
into account other factors (responsibility, stress, etc.). What kind of norm
is considered appropriate thus depends on the circumstances and is an em-
pirical question.
The experimental literature has studied contribution norms and behavior
in the context of voluntary contribution mechanisms for homogeneous groups
extensively (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey). In a classical linear voluntary
contribution mechanism, group members receive an endowment from which
they can invest in a group project with an outcome that is shared equally
amongst all members at the end of the project. The marginal return for
each member of one unit contributed to the group project by any member
is what the literature has termed the marginal per capita return. To assess
the eﬀect of this marginal return on contributions, some studies compare
homogeneous groups that diﬀer in their marginal returns (e.g., Isaac and
Walker (1998)). One main result of these studies is that groups with higher
marginal returns have an increased propensity to contribute. This ﬁnding
seems to be robust across studies and for diﬀerent marginal returns and
numbers of group members.
Only a few studies have examined heterogeneous groups in which mem-
bers vary in their marginal returns.3 Fisher et al. (1995) and Tan (2008)
compare the type speciﬁc behavior of heterogeneous groups consisting of
2The case was eventually settled with a compromise in which part-time student vio-
linists were hired for some rehearsals to ﬁll in for the overworked violinists (see Klassik
News, March 29, 2004 on klassik.com).
3Other experimental studies have focused on alternative sources of heterogeneity, for
example, wealth (e.g., Buckley and Croson (2006) and Chan et al. (1996)) or marginal
beneﬁts (e.g., Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) and Bagnoli and Mckee (1991)).
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members with high and low marginal returns to that of homogeneous groups.
Within heterogeneous groups, both studies ﬁnd that individuals whose con-
tributions have higher marginal returns to the public good tend to have a
higher propensity to contribute than do members of the same group with
lower marginal returns. These results seem to suggest that eﬃciency con-
cerns prevail in controlled laboratory studies. However, in these studies, the
contributor beneﬁts from his or her own contribution; hence, contributions
of high types are not only more eﬃcient but also less costly for the donor.
High types might therefore contribute more either because they can better
advance the joint project or because their costs of contribution are low.
The present study investigates the eﬀect of the ﬁrst of these two factors
on contributions, which we will refer to as “productivity.” The literature
on distributive justice has suggested diﬀerent fair contribution and sharing
rules (Konow (2003)). Based on this literature, we motivate three plausi-
ble social norms, namely an equal nominal contribution, an equal eﬀective
contribution, and an eﬃcient contribution norm, that we examine experi-
mentally. To do so, ﬁrst we introduce heterogeneity by allowing the marginal
returns of individual contributions to vary between two types, a low and a
high productivity type, in a standard linear voluntary contribution mecha-
nism while maintaining symmetry of costs among group members. Second,
we vary the level of information about heterogeneity in three diﬀerent treat-
ments. In the baseline treatment, group members are informed about their
own marginal returns as well as about individual nominal contributions of
others. In the other two treatments, participants are additionally informed
about the marginal returns of the other productivity type. Additionally, in
the third treatment, participants also know which productivity type made a
particular contribution. This design allows us to control the extent to which
individuals know about heterogeneity, and hence, it provides restrictions on
the contribution norms that can be applied. In this way we aim to discrimi-
nate between diﬀerent contribution norms and to examine the joint eﬀect of
a heterogeneous environment and information on voluntary contributions.
Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: When individuals are made
aware of the heterogeneity in productivity, the average propensity to con-
tribute increases. However, the information structure evokes diﬀerent rela-
tive contribution patterns between types, resulting in no conclusive support
for any one particular contribution norm. The less information that is avail-
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able, the more equal contribution norms prevail; the more information that
is available, the more eﬃcient contribution norms take over. The informa-
tion about heterogeneity aﬀects contribution behavior diﬀerently depending
on productivity type. Public information about heterogeneity in productiv-
ity within a group increases individual contributions almost exclusively for
low types, who contribute more than high types, whereas the latter do not
change their contribution behavior compared to the no information bench-
mark. More detailed feedback information on the contributor’s type induces
high types to contribute more and, at the same time, low types to lower their
contributions compared to the situation with partial information.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the model of our voluntary contribution mechanism and presents be-
havioral motives to contribute. Section 3 describes the experimental design,
explains how information about heterogeneity is varied across treatments
and presents the behavioral predictions. Section 4 gives an overview of the
stated contribution norms and aggregated contribution behavior. Section 5
presents a dynamic analysis of individual contribution behavior. Section 6
discusses our results in the light of the literature and section 7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The linear voluntary contribution mechanism
In order to introduce heterogeneity in the economic environment, we aug-
ment the standard linear model of the voluntary contribution mechanism
(VCM). First, we introduce a productivity factor for each group member to
reﬂect heterogeneity in individuals’ ability to produce the public good. The
joint project in a group with 푛 members can be written as:
퐺 =
푛∑
푗=1
(푝푗푦푗)
where 푦푗 is an individual’s nominal contribution to the group project and
푝푗 denotes the individual’s productivity. Each group member has either
high or low productivity, i.e., 푝푗 ∈
{
푝퐻 , 푝퐿
}
for all 푗 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛}. We will
refer to individuals with high productivity as H -types, and those with low
productivity as L-types. Any unit contributed to the joint project is eﬃcient
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but units of H -types progress the group project further, i.e., 1 < 푝퐿 <
푝퐻 . The eﬀective contribution of each group member to the joint project
therefore depends on two factors: the individual nominal contribution (푦푗)
and the individual productivity (푝푗). We consider a group that is composed
of an equal number of H -types and L-types.
Second, we ensure identical pecuniary incentives to contribute across all
group members as follows: the payoﬀ of individual 푖 from the public good
is independent of 푖’s contribution. In other words, each individual does not
beneﬁt from his or her own contribution but receives a share of the output
generated by the contributions of only the other group members. Addi-
tionally, the contribution of one other member with diﬀerent productivity
is excluded from the public good pool, so that each subject beneﬁts from
a public good pool provided by a balanced number of individuals of both
productivity types. The payoﬀ of an individual 푖 with an endowment 푤
resulting from the interaction in a group with 푛 members can be written as
휋푖 = 푤 − 푦푖 +퐺푖. (1)
Each group member beneﬁts from the amount allocated to the own account
(푤 − 푦푖) and the returns 퐺푖 from the joint project, where
퐺푖 =
1
푛− 2
∑
푗 ∕={푖,푘}
(푝푗푦푗), 푝푖 ∕= 푝푘, and 푖, 푗, 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛}
and 퐺 =
푛∑
푗=1
(푝푗푦푗) =
푛∑
푖=1
퐺푖.
The following are the novel features of our model. First, unlike in the
standard VCM, group members are excluded from the returns generated
by their own contributions. This is necessary because, otherwise, H -types
not only advance the joint project more but also beneﬁt from their own
contributions more than L-types do, resulting in two motivations to give:
higher eﬃciency and lower costs of contributing. Excluding members from
beneﬁting from their own contribution keeps contribution costs constant
across types and prevents the described confound. Second, group members
nevertheless face a symmetrical payoﬀ structure: every individual beneﬁts
only from contributions of an equal number of both productivity types.
Hence, both productivity types are equally accounted for in everyone’s payoﬀ
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function. For example, consider a group composed of six members; three
H -types and three L-types. An L-type individual 푖’s payoﬀ from the public
good is derived as 1/4 of the sum of the contributions by the two other
L-types and two randomly selected H -types. Consequently, by excluding
the contributions of the individual him- or herself and of one member of the
opposite type, we maintain the symmetry of individual payoﬀ functions.
2.2 Contribution motives
Eﬃciency requires that total surplus be maximized when each group member
invests his or her whole endowment in the group project because ∂
∑
휋푘/∂푦푖 =
−1 + 푝푖 > 0. However, from an individual point of view, there is a strong
incentive not to contribute to the joint project because the marginal beneﬁt
of contributing one point is −1, i.e., ∂휋푖/∂푦푖 = −1. A number of empirical
and experimental studies on social dilemma problems suggest diﬀerent indi-
vidual motivations that can help to overcome such an incentive to free-ride
and to arrive at equilibria that lie in between those two extreme cases.
First, suppose individuals are concerned not only with advancing their
own income but also with increasing others’ payoﬀ. Those persons might be
motivated by either altruism or concerns for social eﬃciency. We approxi-
mate the utility function of such a person by
푈푖 = 휋푖 +푅푖(휋−푖)
where 푅푖(휋−푖) is a linear, continuous, increasing and twice diﬀerentiable
function that captures an individual’s concern for others’ payoﬀ.
One unit contributed by group member 푖 increases the public good,
hence, the total payoﬀ of the other group members by 푝푖, because
∂퐺
∂푦푖
=
∂퐺−푖
∂푦푖
=
∂휋−푖
∂푦푖
= 푝푖.
From this it follows that group member 푖 will contribute to the public good
as long as his marginal utility gain is suﬃciently high so that it satisﬁes the
following ﬁrst-order condition,
∂푈푖
∂푦푖
= −1 + ∂푅푖(휋−푖)
∂휋−푖
푝푖 ≥ 0,
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implying
∂푅푖(휋−푖)
∂휋−푖
≥ 1
푝푖
. (2)
Therefore, when individuals are altruistic or concerned about social eﬃ-
ciency and their marginal utility in others’ payoﬀ is either constant or de-
creasing, H -types will, on average, contribute more than L-types. Because
1 < 푝퐿 < 푝퐻 , it is easier for H -types than for L-types to satisfy condition
(2). Being concerned about what is socially optimal can be a norm based on
the understanding that “people often seek to maximize surplus, sometimes
at a personal cost, and that this goal is regarded as ‘fair’.” (Konow (2003),
p.1205). We will refer to this norm hereafter as the eﬃcient contribution
norm.
Second, when group members observe nominal contributions of others
(푦푗), norms concerning equity may play a role in determining individual lev-
els of contribution to a public good. The proportionality principle is often
used as a measure of equity (see Konow (2003) for a more general discus-
sion of justice theories). This principle suggests that an individual’s beneﬁt
from a joint project should be in proportion to the degree to which a person
contributed to the project. Because in VCMs, beneﬁts from public goods
are shared equally among group members, according to the proportionality
principle, all individuals are expected to contribute equally. When group
members diﬀer in their productivity, equity depends on the way individ-
ual contributions are evaluated. Thereby, contributions might be evaluated
with reference either to nominal units of endowment contributed (푦푖) or to
their ‘eﬀective’ impact on the joint project (푝푖푦푖). Hereafter we will refer to
these norms as the equal nominal contribution norm and the equal eﬀective
contribution norm, respectively.
It is important to note that if the reference point of the proportionality
principle is nominal contributions, then group members’ knowledge about
heterogeneity in the group will have no inﬂuence on contribution behavior.
On the other hand, eﬀective contributions can only be used as a reference
point when there is suﬃcient information about heterogeneity in a popula-
tion. Therefore, the intensity with which diﬀerent reference points of the
proportionality principle can come into play depends on the level of infor-
mation that group members have about the productivity of others.
We vary the information groups have about the productivity of their
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members to investigate if behavior is shaped by eﬃciency concerns or pro-
portional fairness and, for the latter case, which reference point is used. For
instance, if persons act according to a contribution norm that has nominal
contribution levels as a reference point, H -types and L-types would make
the same nominal contributions regardless of whether members are aware
of diﬀerences in productivity within their group. Similarly, behavior should
not change with the level of information when group members are only con-
cerned about altruism or eﬃciency. In this case, H -types would contribute
more on average than L-types regardless of the information they possess
about the diﬀerence in productivity.
If individuals make their contribution decisions according to a contri-
bution norm with reference to eﬀective contributions, however, such norms
cannot come into play without suﬃcient information about the heterogeneity
within the group. In this case, contribution behavior will diﬀer depending
on whether the information about heterogeneity in productivity is public.
More precisely, without information, the reference point remains that of
equal nominal contributions, whereas when information about heterogeneity
is public, L-types will contribute (nominally) more than H -types, resulting
in equal eﬀective contributions of both types.
3 The experiment
3.1 Design and procedure
In light of the diﬀerent contribution motives, what norm is adopted in het-
erogeneous environments is -a priori- not clear. Therefore, we need to rely on
empirical evidence to study the norms that are prevalent in heterogeneous
environments. To provide such empirical evidence, we conducted a public
good experiment. In the experiment, members of a group had to decide how
to divide their private endowment between a private account and a group
project. The nominal contributions of each member to the group project
were public information. The treatment variable in our experiment, the
level of information, varies in two ways: ﬁrst, subjects either do or do not
receive precise information on the distribution of productivity types within
the group, and second, the feedback information about the contributions
of all group members does or does not reveal each contributor’s type. In
particular, we study three treatments with the following information scenar-
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ios. In the No-info treatment, group members know their own productivity,
but not the distribution of types within their group. In the Part-info and
Full-info treatments, the distribution of types is explicitly stated in the in-
structions. Additionally, the feedback information in the Full-info treatment
allows members to link an individual contribution to the contributor’s type.
In sum, the three treatments gradually change the level of information about
the heterogeneity in the population and contributions by diﬀerent types.
Each information treatment comprised nine groups. Each group con-
sisted of six members, three H -types with 푝퐻 = 3.99 and three L-types
with 푝퐿 = 1.33, who interacted with each other over 15 periods.4 A group
member remained either a H -type or a L-type throughout the whole exper-
iment. At the beginning of every period, each group member was endowed
with 푤 =17 points and had to decide how many of them (푦푖) to invest in
a joint project and how many to keep (푤 − 푦푖).5 After all group members
had made their decisions, individual payoﬀs were computed according to
the VCM (as presented in equation 1), and group members were informed
about their payoﬀs. Additionally, a table was displayed containing the his-
tory of contributions by each group member in all previous periods. In the
Full-info treatment, this table also displayed the type of each contributor.
The order of individual contributions in the history table was randomized
so that contributions could not be attributed to a speciﬁc group member.
Prior to the beginning of the ﬁrst period and after the exposition of the
instructions, subjects were asked once to state a contribution norm, i.e.,
what they think is appropriate to contribute, and to predict the average
contribution of others.6 After the experiment, participants completed a
standard personality test.7 A sample copy of the instructions is included in
4The two productivity values were chosen with respect to the parameters used in previ-
ous research on heterogenous marginal per capita returns (MPCR). For instance, the two
MPCRs used in Fisher et al. (1995) were 0.3 and 0.75, implying that a one-unit contribu-
tion by a low (high) MPCR type generates 1.2 (3) units of public goods in groups with
four members. Therefore, the MPCR values used in Fisher et al. (1995) are comparable
to the productivity factors of 1.33 and 3.99 used in our design.
5Experimental earnings were counted in points and exchanged at the end of the exper-
iment for Euros, where 80 points corresponded to 1 Euro.
6We were only interested in the answers to the question about the normative behavior
and asked the two questions so that participants could distinguish between normative and
anticipated behavior. This is important because contribution norms and the anticipated
behavior of others might not necessarily coincide. As contribution norms cannot be in-
centivized, participants were not paid for these answers. We also refrained from providing
incentives for predictions.
7We used the oﬃcial German translation of the revised version of the Sixteen Per-
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Appendix A.
The experiment was computerized and conducted in eight sessions with a
total of 162 undergraduate students from Jena University at the laboratory
of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany.8 Participants
were between 19 and 36 years old and approximately half of them were
female (57%). At the end of each session, subjects received their payoﬀ from
the experiment and a show-up fee of 2.5 Euros in cash. Subjects earned on
average 5.7 Euros for the 15 rounds, which lasted on average 30 minutes.9
3.2 Behavioral predictions
In light of the norms discussed in section 2.2 and our experimental design,
we expected the following behavior in our experiment.
(i) Eﬃcient contributions norm:
If individuals are concerned about others’ payoﬀ and social eﬃciency, both
types will contribute to the joint project, with H -types contributing on
average more than L-types. The level of information that group members
have about the heterogeneity in productivity within the group, will have no
inﬂuence on contribution levels (0 < 푦퐿 < 푦퐻 in all treatments).
(ii) Equal nominal contributions norm:
If individuals follow the proportionality principle with nominal contribu-
tions as a reference point, group members will contribute the same amounts
regardless of their type and whether they are aware of the heterogeneity in
productivity within the group (푦푖 = 푦푘, ∀푖 ∕= 푘 in all treatments).
(iii) Equal eﬀective contributions norm:
(iii.1) If individuals follow the proportionality principle with eﬀective con-
tributions as a reference point, both types will make the same nominal con-
tributions when there is no information about heterogeneity (푦푖 = 푦푘,∀푖 ∕= 푘
in the No-info treatment). However, when individuals are informed about
the heterogeneity in productivity in the group, L-types will contribute more
than H -types resulting in equal eﬀective contributions to the joint project
sonality Factor Questionnaire (Cattell et al. (1993)) translated by Schneewind and Graf
(1998).
8Recruitment was performed with the help of an online system (ORSEE Greiner
(2004)), and the experiment was executed using the software zTree (Fischbacher (2007)).
9Each session comprised two phases of group interactions lasting 15 periods each. In
this article we consider only the ﬁrst phase. Average earnings for the whole experiment
(including both phases) were about 11 Euros.
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by H -types and L-types (if 푖 is a L-type and 푘 is a H -type, 푝퐿푦푖 = 푝
퐻푦푘
implies 푦푖 > 푦푘 in the Part-info and Full-info treatments).
(iii.2) In order to conform to a norm, group members need to compare them-
selves to their peers, and especially to peers of their own and the other type,
with eﬃcient or eﬀective contributions as possible reference points. Detailed
information on contributors’ types supports coordination of type speciﬁc
contribution norms. It might not be possible to establish and maintain
type speciﬁc contribution norms when types cannot be identiﬁed. Whereas
the Part-info treatment only informs group members about the presence of
heterogeneity, the Full-info treatment allows group members to link oth-
ers’ contribution behaviors to their types. Therefore, even though diﬀerent
contribution norms might come into play with public knowledge about het-
erogeneity, coordination on these norms might be more easily established in
the Full-info treatment and we expect behavior in the Part-info treatment
to be ampliﬁed in the Full-info treatment.
4 Data: Stated Norms and Contributions
In this section, we report stated norms and contributions aggregated over
the 15 periods of the experiment. We ﬁrst evaluate the contribution norms
and actual contributions in light of our behavioral predictions. Second, we
examine social welfare as observed in the experiment.
Stated private contribution norms and contributions by type
Contribution norms can be classiﬁed into two types, social and private con-
tribution norms. Social contribution norms are constructed and fortiﬁed by
social interaction. In contrast, private norms may be held by individuals
prior to any social interaction. It is therefore natural to think that partic-
ipants may have entered this experiment with their own private norms. In
order to study these norms, we elicited participants’ private norms for nom-
inal contributions after introducing them to the details of the experiment,
but before they started interacting with each other.10
10We elicited private norms in the No-info treatment using the question “What transfer
to the project do you think is appropriate?” In the other two treatments the following
two questions were asked: “What transfer to the project do you think is appropriate for a
person whose productivity factor is 1.33?” and “What transfer to the project do you think
is appropriate for a person whose productivity factor is 3.99?” These questions allowed
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Panel A of Table 1 reports median (nominal) contribution norms for
each treatment separately by productivity type.11,12 The stated contribution
norms are fairly identical across treatments and types.13 Neither in the No-
info nor in the Part-info treatment could we detect statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the medians of the stated contribution norms for each
type.14 This is equally true for H -types in the Full-info treatment.15 In
this respect, the stated private norms reﬂect an equal nominal contribution
norm as implied by prediction (ii). The only exception are L-types in the
Full-info treatment, who report signiﬁcantly higher contribution norms for
H -types (10.00) than for L-types (9.00), supporting the idea of an eﬃcient
contribution norm.16
Social norms that evolve via interaction within a group are, on the other
hand, reﬂected in actual contribution behavior. Panel B of Table 1 dis-
plays median (nominal) contributions observed in each group by treatment
and by productivity type. Both types in the No-info treatment make the
same contributions to the joint project (7.00). In the treatments in which
information is provided, both types contribute at least as much as in the
No-info treatment. Additionally, in the Part-info treatment, the median L-
type contributes more (10.00) than the median H -type (9.00). Furthermore,
although the median contribution of both types is the same in the Full-info
treatment (8.00), the interquartile range is much larger for H -types (10.00
vs. 5.00 for L-types), indicating a wider dispersion of their contributions.
us to identify normative expectations separately for contributions of L-types and H -types
and to evaluate how those norms vary by type.
11Unless indicated otherwise, we refer to nominal contributions.
12Note that participants in the No-info treatment were not aware of the heterogeneity
in the group. Therefore, the contribution norms stated by H -types are taken as reﬂecting
norms for H -types. The same holds for L-types.
13We compared norms stated by diﬀerent persons using a two-sided non-parametric
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (hereafter referred to as “WMW-test”) for two independent
samples.
WMW tests: No-info vs. Part-info: H -types: 푝 = 0.75 and L-types: 푝 = 0.77. We ﬁnd
the same results when conditioning on the respondent’s own type.
14For the comparison of contribution norms for diﬀerent types within the Part-info
and Full-info treatments, we used a two-sided non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test
(hereafter referred to as “W-test”) for matched pairs. Thereby, one person’s contribution
norm for H -types and L-types constitutes one pair.
WMW-test: 푝 = 0.70 (No-info). W-tests: 푝 = 0.50 (Part-info); 푝 = 0.60 (Part-info;
H -types) and 푝 = 0.53 (Part-info; L-types).
15No diﬀerence from the contribution norms for both types stated by H -types, W-test:
푝 = 0.43
16W-test: 푝 = 0.04
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We cannot reject the null hypothesis that types within treatments make the
same contributions at conventional levels of signiﬁcance.17
Hence, with the exception of L-types in the Full-info treatment, private
and social norms seem to endorse equal nominal contributions.
Social welfare
In this VCM, contributions of either productivity type enhance social wel-
fare. However, eﬀective contributions of H -types are greater than those of
L-types. Hence, the extent to which information about heterogeneity aﬀects
social welfare depends on whether and how types react to the information
when making their contribution decisions. Panel C of Table 1 presents the
median of individual payoﬀs within a group as an indicator of group welfare.
Social welfare increases progressively from the No-info treatment (27.97) to
the Part-info treatment (32.08) and the Full-info treatment (34.09), but the
diﬀerences between group medians are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The preceding analysis aggregated contributions over time into a sin-
gle median observation per group. Though necessary for appropriate non-
parametric testing, it thereby neglects information contained in the data.
The lack of signiﬁcant variation in the analysis of aggregated data is there-
fore not surprising. It is, however, natural to think that information exerts
its eﬀect in the dynamics of the interaction throughout the course of the
experiment. To develop a more detailed account of the eﬀect of heterogene-
ity, or more precisely, of the extent to which heterogeneity in productivity is
common information in a group, we examine the dynamics of contribution
behavior over time in the following section.
17WMW-tests: No-info: 푝 = 0.96, Part-info: 푝 = 0.35, and Full-info: 푝 = 0.59.
W-tests: H -types: No-info vs. Part-info (p=0.76), Part-info vs. Full-info (p=0.48), No-
info vs. Full-info (p=0.26).
L-types: No-info vs. Part-info (p=0.17), Part-info vs. Full-info (p=0.41), No-info vs.
Full-info (p=0.72).
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Treatments
No-Info Part-Info Full-Info
Panel A Private Norms on nominal contributions
(unit of observation: individual participant)
H -type L-type H -type L-type H -type L-type
Median 10.00 8.00 9.00 8.00 10.00 9.50
IQR 12.00 10.00 8.00 5.00 10.00 10.00
Nobs 27 27 54 54 54 54
reported by H -types
H -type L-type H -type L-type H -type L-type
Median 10.00 - 9.00 8.00 10.00 10.00
IQR 12.00 - 8.00 5.00 11.00 10.00
Nobs 27 - 27 27 27 27
reported by L-types
H -type L-type H -type L-type H -type L-type
Median - 8.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 9.00
IQR - 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.00 6.00
Nobs - 27 27 27 27 27
Panel B Nominal contributions by type
(unit of observation: group median over 15 periods)
H -type L-type H -type L-type H -type L-type
Median 7.00 7.00 9.00 10.00 8.00 8.00
IQR 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 10.00 5.00
Nobs 9 9 9 9 9 9
Panel C Social Welfare
(unit of observation: group median over 15 periods)
Median 27.97 32.08 34.09
IQR 10.45 10.81 16.64
Nobs 9 9 9
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the experimental data: medians and 27-
75% interquantile ranges
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5 Dynamic analysis of contribution behavior
This section explicitly considers the dynamic nature of the data and analyzes
contribution behavior over time. By doing so, we aim to provide statistical
evidence of how individual contribution behavior evolves in line with plau-
sible contribution norms and how information about heterogeneity aﬀects
individual contribution behavior over time.
Figure 1 plots the average nominal contribution in each period for the
three treatments. Contribution behavior evolves quite diﬀerently over time
according to treatment. Generally, the average contribution is about one
half of the endowment and decreases over time, with a quicker decay at the
end of the experiment. In the No-info treatment, contributions continuously
decrease over time following a general trend observed in other public good
experiments, while in the two treatments with information about hetero-
geneity, average contributions seem to increase initially before following the
general trend of decay.
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Figure 1: Average nominal contributions as a proportion of the endowment
for the three treatments (No-info, Part-info and Full-info)
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5.1 Empirical model speciﬁcation
We describe the proportion that individual 푖 contributes from his or her own
endowment in period 푡, 푦★푖푡, as the function:
푦★푖푡 = 훾 + 휔퐻푖푔ℎ+ 푓(푡) + 푥푖훽 + 휖푖푡 (3)
Where 훾 indicates the basic contribution level, 휔 captures the eﬀect of pro-
ductivity (with the dummy variable 퐻푖푔ℎ being equal to one if 푖 is a H -type
and zero otherwise). We control for time trends by including 푓(푡), a function
of time. The vector 푥푖 represents the individual observable characteristics
of age, gender, and measures of self-control obtained from the personality
questionnaire. Their inﬂuence on contributions is captured by the parameter
훽. Idiosyncratic errors, 휖푖푡, are assumed to be independent of productivity
and other individual characteristics in 푥푖.
The inﬂuence of information is captured by treatment dummies. The
complete model, including treatment dummies, with the No-info treatment
as a baseline is given by:
푦★푖푡 = 훾0 + 훾1Part-info+ 훾2Full-info (4)
+ 휔0퐻푖푔ℎ+ 휔1퐻푖푔ℎ ⋅ Part-info+ 휔2퐻푖푔ℎ ⋅ Full-info
+ 푓(푡) + 푥푖훽 + 휖푖푡
Given the design of the experiment, individual contributions to the joint
project are doubly censored, ﬁrst at the lowest contribution level of 0 units
and second at the highest contribution level of 17 units, the period endow-
ment.18 We therefore use a standard regression doubly censored Tobit model
to estimate the relation for the latent contribution proportions 푦★푖푡 described
in model (4) with
푦푖푡
⎧⎨⎩
= 0 if 푦★푖푡 ≤ 0,
= 푦★푖푡 if 0 < 푦
★
푖푡 < 1,
= 1 if 푦★푖푡 ≥ 1.
(5)
18In fact, 23% and 21% of all contribution decisions were at the upper and lower limits,
respectively.
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5.2 Results
Baseline: speciﬁcation 1
We estimate two speciﬁcations of the model in equation (4). Both speciﬁca-
tions include the same set of background characteristics, but vary in the way
time eﬀects are modeled. In speciﬁcation 1, the time trend is modeled non-
parametrically by including dummy variables for each period (푓(푡) = 훿푡1푡
with 1푡 being an indicator function for period 푡 for 푡 > 1 and 푓(1) = 0).
Estimation results are reported in Table 2.
The ﬁrst thing to note from the results of speciﬁcation 1 is that group
members invest a positive amount of their endowment (훾0 > 0 with 푝 =
0.000) in the group project. Further, information about heterogeneity has a
positive impact on contributions (훾1, 훾2 and 휔2 > 0 with 푝 = 0.000). In the
Full-info treatment, this increase is almost exclusively driven by the more
productive type (훾2 = 0.076 < 휔2 = 0.326). In the other two treatments
(No-info and Part-info), H -types contribute signiﬁcantly less compared to
their L-type colleagues, but this eﬀect is relatively small (휔0 = −0.069, 푝 =
0.000 and 휔1 = 0.011, 푝 = 0.420). The period dummy coeﬃcients reveal
a non-linear time trend, indicating an increase in contribution levels un-
til period 6 and a strong decrease over the last third of the experiment
(after period 12). Finally, we ﬁnd that women tend to make signiﬁcantly
smaller contributions (훽2 = −0.235 with 푝 = 0.000) and that age and norm
obedience have signiﬁcant but relatively small negative inﬂuences on contri-
butions.
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Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2
Variable Parameter Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
Constant 훾0 0.950 10.123 1.041 6.693
Part-info 훾1 0.199 11.547 0.075 0.373
Full-info 훾2 0.076 4.563 -0.000 -0.002
H -type 휔0 -0.069 -3.807 -0.052 -0.242
H -type Part-info 휔1 0.011 0.420 0.059 0.201
H -type Full-info 휔2 0.326 14.403 0.364 1.323
linear Time trend 휏10 0.013 0.277
Part-info 휏11 0.062 1.015
Full-info 휏12 0.054 0.896
H -type 휏13 0.010 0.145
H -type Part-info 휏14 -0.070 -0.760
H -type Full-info 휏15 -0.033 -0.393
quadratic Time trend 휏20 -0.002 -0.871
Part-info 휏21 -0.004 -1.235
Full-info 휏22 -0.004 -1.168
H -type 휏23 -0.001 -0.290
H -type Part-info 휏24 0.006 1.110
H -type Full-info 휏25 0.003 0.546
Background characteristics Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes No
Number of Observations 2430 2430
Number of Parameters 23 21
휎휖 0.582 62.963 0.582 47.116
Log-Likelihood value -33067 -33050.4
Table 2: Estimation results for nominal contribution behavior (dependent
variable: proportion that an individual contributes from his or her initial
endowment).
Other parameter estimates are presented in Table 3 in Appendix C.
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Time and treatment interaction eﬀects: speciﬁcation 2
In a second speciﬁcation, we model the time trend as a quadratic function
including interaction eﬀects with productivity and information:19
푓(푡) = 휏10 ⋅ 푡+ 휏20 ⋅ 푡2 + 퐼푛푡푒푟푎푐푡푖표푛(푡,퐻푖푔ℎ,Part-info,Full-info). (6)
This allows us to account for both non-linear eﬀects of periods and interac-
tions with the diﬀerent treatments while minimizing the loss of degrees of
freedom. Estimation results are presented in Table 2.
Speciﬁcation 2 reveals that the eﬀect of treatment variables material-
izes largely through dynamic interactions over the periods. More precisely,
information about heterogeneity has a non-linear eﬀect on individual con-
tributions of both productivity types. Instead of the standard monotonic
decay, they increase before they diminish (as captured by the positive coef-
ﬁcients 휏11 and 휏12 and the negative coeﬃcients 휏21 and 휏22). Moreover, the
positive coeﬃcients 휏24 and 휏25 suggest that additional information counter-
balances the declining trend for contributions of H -types. In order to assess
the global picture of those individual interactions and to test whether their
joint eﬀect is signiﬁcant, we compute expected contributions and calculate
marginal eﬀects using our estimated parameters.20 The results are presented
in Figure 2. The upper panels in Figure 2 present predicted average nominal
contributions as a proportion of the endowment for H - and L-types in each
treatment, while the lower panels show the marginal eﬀects of productivity
on contributions with 95% conﬁdence bounds.
The upper left panel in Figure 2 depicts the No-info treatment. It sug-
gests that in the absence of information about heterogeneity both types
make the same nominal contributions and exhibit a similar monotonic de-
cay of their individual contributions. The marginal eﬀects analysis for this
case, presented in the lower left panel, conﬁrms this observation. We cannot
19The detailed time function is given by:
푓(푡) = 휏10 ⋅ 푡+ 휏11 ⋅ 푡 ⋅ Part-info+ 휏12 ⋅ 푡 ⋅ Full-info
+ 휏13 ⋅ 푡 ⋅퐻푖푔ℎ+ 휏14 ⋅ 푡 ⋅퐻푖푔ℎ ⋅ Part-info+ 휏15 ⋅ 푡 ⋅퐻푖푔ℎ ⋅ Full-info
+ 휏20 ⋅ 푡2 + 휏21 ⋅ 푡2 ⋅ Part-info+ 휏12 ⋅ 푡2 ⋅ Full-info
+ 휏23 ⋅ 푡2 ⋅퐻푖푔ℎ+ 휏24 ⋅ 푡2 ⋅퐻푖푔ℎ ⋅ Part-info+ 휏15 ⋅ 푡2 ⋅퐻푖푔ℎ ⋅ Full-info
20Details of the estimation procedure of the marginal eﬀects are included in Appendix
B.
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Figure 2: Upper panels: Predicted average contributions (as a proportion
of the initial endowment) over time for each treatment and type.
Lower panels: Marginal eﬀects of productivity on contributions for each
treatment. (The graphs project the diﬀerence in relative nominal contribu-
tions between H -types and L-types.)
reject the null hypothesis of no eﬀect throughout periods 1 to 12.
The other four panels illustrate the case for the treatments with more
information. In contrast to the No-info treatment, we observe that contri-
butions of both types are not monotonically declining but rather parabolic,
depicting the tendency for average contributions to increase initially be-
fore following the standard pattern of decay. Furthermore, from the lower
middle and lower right panels, we learn that contribution behavior diﬀers
signiﬁcantly between the two types and also between the Part-info and the
Full-info treatments indicating the extent to which types respond diﬀerently
to the information about heterogeneity.
The upper and lower middle panels illustrate behavior in the Part-info
treatment. There, we observe L-types contributing between 5% and 10%
more of their endowments than H -types. The ﬁndings so far support our
behavioral prediction (iii.1) with behavior that goes in the direction of equal
eﬀective contributions. According to our prediction (iii.2), we expected be-
havior in the Full-info treatment to reconﬁrm the ﬁnding from the Part-info
treatment because in the former coordination is facilitated by informing
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group members additionally about a contributor’s type. Contrary to this
conjecture, we observe a reversal of contribution behavior between H - and
L-types. The predicted contributions and marginal eﬀects for the Full-info
treatment, illustrated in the upper and lower right panels, indicate that
when contributions can be linked to the type of the contributor, H -types
give signiﬁcantly more than L-types. The lower right panel indicates that
this diﬀerence comprises around 15% of the endowment and remains con-
stant over time as contributions of both types follow the same time trend.
The dynamic behavior that we observe in diﬀerent treatments is very
similar between types, with two notable exceptions. In the No-info treat-
ment, contributions by H -types decline in the last three periods slightly
faster than those made by L-types, leading to a signiﬁcant but almost neg-
ligible diﬀerence in contributions between the two types. In the Part-info
treatment, the general decline in contributions over time is less pronounced
for H -types. As a result, in the last three periods, contributions by the two
types are no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
A summary of the above observations is in order. On one hand, we
ﬁnd evidence against the eﬃcient contribution norm, where individuals are
supposed to react solely to their individual productivity parameter. This
comes from the ﬁndings in the No-info and Part-info treatments, where
contribution behavior instead supports an equal eﬀective contribution norm.
On the other hand, in the Full-info treatment, we observe contribution be-
havior that is opposite to the behavior observed in the Part-info treatment,
providing evidence for the eﬃcient contribution norm.
Given this mixed evidence, we conclude that individuals do not react
solely to their own productivity, nor do equal contribution norms persist
in the presence of suﬃcient information on heterogeneity. Second, eﬃcient
contributions emerge when information is provided within a group about in-
dividuals’ characteristics and contribution behavior. Third, the information
structure aﬀects types diﬀerently.
6 Discussion
The present experiment was designed to investigate the impact of produc-
tivity isolated from costs of contribution. Therefore, we excluded subjects
from the returns of their own contributions. This is quite diﬀerent from
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the standard experimental public goods literature, in which a person always
beneﬁts from his or her own contribution (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey).
Despite this diﬀerence in design, in agreement with ﬁndings in this liter-
ature, we found positive contributions to the joint project and a common
decay in contributions over time.
There are few studies in the literature on public goods experiments that
examine groups whose members vary in the marginal returns that a con-
tributed unit generates for themselves and others, also referred to as MPCR
(“marginal per capita return”) (Fisher et al. (1995) and Tan (2008)). In
these experiments, group members receive the marginal returns of their own
contributions. As a consequence, contributions of members with high pro-
ductivity are less costly for the donor. Our experimental design allows us to
isolate the eﬀect of productivity on contributions; hence, our results com-
plement the ﬁndings of those studies.
In Tan, the same groups of four persons participate in three subsequent
treatments. Her second treatment is comparable to our Full-info treatment.
There, half of the group is assigned a high MPCR (0.9) and the other half
a low MPCR (0.3). She ﬁnds that members with a high MPCR contribute
more than those with a low MPCR, a ﬁnding qualitatively similar to our
results. In Fisher et al., two out of four group members have a high MPCR
(0.75) and the other two a low MPCR (0.3). The same group members
interact in two parts of ten periods each. After the ﬁrst ten periods, members
with a low MPCR are assigned a high MPCR and vice versa. In the ﬁrst part
of the ﬁrst sessions they conducted, Fisher et al. observed behavior that they
named “poisoning of the well” as high types contributed less than low types.
The diﬀerence in contributions between types was reversed in the second
part, when high types contributed more than low types. These ﬁndings
resemble the diﬀerences between our Part-info and Full-info treatments.
Given our results, we conjecture that their ﬁndings occurred due to the
diﬀerent information scenarios in the two parts of their experiment. Indeed,
participants in their experiments were only implicitly informed about the
heterogeneity in the group. They might have anticipated diﬀerent MPCRs
in the ﬁrst part, but they knew about it for sure in the second part after they
had switched types. Our conjecture might ﬁnd even more support in further
observations of Fisher et al. After recognizing the poisoning of the well eﬀect,
in the remaining sessions, participants were explicitly reminded before the
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ﬁrst part of the experiment of the possibility of diﬀerent private MPCRs.
In those later sessions, the poisoning of the well eﬀect disappeared.21
The similarity of our results to those of Fisher et al. (1995) and Tan
(2008) indicates that the same information structure leads to similar con-
tribution patterns between types regardless of whether they have the same
or diﬀerent contribution costs. The ﬁndings in our experiment and the
comparison with the literature underline the importance of the information
structure. Therefore, we will conclude by discussing diﬀerences in behavioral
responses to information by productivity type.
Reactions of types to information
In order to investigate how both types react to the provision of information
about heterogeneity, we computed marginal eﬀects. Results are presented
in Figure 3, with marginal eﬀects of information about heterogeneity on
the individual contribution behavior of H -types in the upper panels and of
L-types in the lower panels.
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Figure 3: Marginal eﬀects of information on contribution for L-types and H -
types. (The graphs project the diﬀerence in relative nominal contributions
between two treatments.)
21Fisher et al. write, “This greater occurrence of poisoning type behavior in only Year
1 with only the high MPCR types in only the ﬁrst ﬁve groups remains a mystery to us.”
p. 265, Footnote 11.
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The upper left corner panel shows the marginal eﬀects of H -types know-
ing that group members vary in their productivity (Part-info) vs. having
no information (No-info). In the ﬁrst half of the experiment, H -types in
both treatments contributed similarly, but from period 8 onwards, they con-
tributed signiﬁcantly more in the Part-info treatment. This can be explained
by the fact that contributions of H -types in the No-info treatment exhibited
the standard pattern of decay whereas, in the Part-info treatment, they re-
mained relatively stable over time. The marginal eﬀects of having (partial)
information (Part-info) vs. additional feedback on the type of contributor
(Full-info) are depicted in the upper right panel. For most of the experiment,
H -types contributed between 10 and 20 percent more of their initial endow-
ment in the Full-info treatment than in the Part-info treatment. However,
in the last two periods, contributions no longer diﬀered signiﬁcantly. Once
again, this can be explained by the fact that contributions of H -types in the
Part-info treatment do not exhibit the pattern of decay, whereas they do in
the Full-info treatment. The upper middle panel shows the overall positive
and relatively stable eﬀect of around 20 percent on H -types’ contributions
of passing from having no information (No-info) to having full information
(Full-info).
We ﬁnd very diﬀerent marginal eﬀects for L-types, as shown in the lower
panels of Figure 3. The lower left and middle panels present the eﬀect
of having (partial) information (Part-info) and being fully informed about
the type of the contributor (Full-info), respectively, compared to having no
information about group heterogeneity (No-info). The two ﬁgures indicate
that information on heterogeneity generally increases the contributions of
L-types. Whereas contributions were around 15 percent in the Part-info
treatment, they were only around 5 percent in the Full-info treatment. This
explains the negative marginal eﬀect of L-types’ contributions in the Full-
info vs. Part-info treatment depicted in the lower right panel.
In conclusion, the apparent “poisoning of the well” eﬀect reported by
Fisher et al. (1995) and replicated in our study is the joint result of divergent
reactions of the two types. When there is (partial) information on hetero-
geneity, H -types do not contribute less compared to the situation without
this information. However, L-types increase their contributions when group
members have partial information on the heterogeneity in productivity and,
albeit less so, when all group members have full information. Indeed, in
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the latter information scenario, H -types contribute much more, resulting in
the ﬁnding of H -types contributing less than L-types in the Part-info treat-
ment and more than L-types in the Full-info treatment. Whether there are
particular forces of social pressure in place that emerge from lowering the
anonymity of contributors (even though only the type of the contributor is
known) that aﬀect L-types and H -types diﬀerently is at this point open for
discussion and left for further research.
Finally, few and inconclusive studies exist on the eﬀect of information on
contributions to VCMs. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and Croson and Marks
(1998) ﬁnd that revealing information about individual contributions as well
as individual characteristics increases individual contributions. Marks and
Croson (1999) ﬁnd that information on heterogeneous valuations of public
goods does not signiﬁcantly alter the aggregate level of contributions. Our
results add empirical evidence of the behavior of heterogeneous groups to
this literature.
7 Conclusions
This article studies the eﬀects of heterogeneity in productivity on voluntary
contribution behavior to a joint project using experimental data. We intro-
duce heterogeneity in a standard linear voluntary contribution mechanism
by varying the marginal products of individual contributions. In order to
separate the eﬀects of productivity from the costs of contribution, group
members do not beneﬁt from their own contributions. We use information
as a treatment variable to distinguish between alternative plausible contri-
bution norms. To this end, we gradually increase the level of information
about heterogeneity in three treatments to control what subjects know about
the heterogeneity.
An important ﬁnding of this study is that the information structure sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀects individuals’ contribution behavior when individuals diﬀer
in their productivity. Our analysis reveals that the information structure
evokes diﬀerent relative contribution patterns for the two types, resulting
in no conclusive support for any particular contribution norm. The less in-
formation that is available, the more equal contribution norms prevail; but
the more information that is available, the more eﬃcient contribution norms
take over.
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Our ﬁndings outline the importance of the information structure con-
cerning contributions to joint projects with heterogeneous group members,
such as teamwork and charitable giving. Further studies that examine struc-
turally how public information on individual behavior engenders contribu-
tion behavior will be particularly valuable for designing institutions in which
persons with diﬀerent abilities interact.
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Appendices
A Instructions
This is a translated version of the German instructions used for the exper-
iment. We provide here the version for H-types in the No-info treatment.
Diﬀerences between treatments are denoted as comments in the text. Com-
ments by the authors included here as information to the reader but not in
the original instructions can be found in parentheses and footnotes.
Welcome to this experiment! These instructions are for your private infor-
mation. Please read the instruction carefully. Please do not talk to the
other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We
will come to you and answer your questions privately.
All amounts are displayed in Points. The exchange rate is: 80 points = 1
Euro.
The experiment consists of two phases of 15 periods each. Before each phase,
all participants are randomly assigned to groups of six. The group’s com-
position remains the same throughout the experiment.
Detailed Information
You are a member of a group of six. At the beginning of each period, every
group member receives 17 points. In every period each group member de-
cides how to split the 17 points. You can transfer points to a private account
or to a group project. Your period payoﬀ is the sum of your income from
the private account and the income from the group project.
Your payoﬀ from the private account:
For each point you transfer to the private account, you receive
a payoﬀ of one point. This means that if you transfer an amount of x
points to your private account, your payoﬀ increases by x points. Nobody
except you beneﬁts from your private account.
Your payoﬀ from the group project:
The payoﬀ you receive from the project is derived as follows. You receive
one quarter of the project’s outcome generated by four other members of
your group. The project’s outcome is the sum of all transfers, whereby each
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transfer to the project is multiplied by an individual factor[, either 1.33 or
3.99. Two of the four members of your group whose transfers will beneﬁt
you have a factor of 1.33, and the other two have a factor of 3.99. Individual
factors were randomly assigned to each group member in the beginning of
the experiment such that three members were assigned a factor of 1.33 and
three were assigned a factor of 3.99. Each member retains the same factor
throughout the whole experiment.]22 The payoﬀs are calculated in the same
manner for all six group members.
Each point you transfer to the group project generates 3.99 points.23
Please note that four other members of your group beneﬁt from your trans-
fer to the project, but you do not.
One period proceeds as follows:
In each period, you receive 17 points. You decide how many of your 17
points to transfer to your private account and how many to the project.
You will make this decision by simply deciding how many points you wish to
transfer to the project. The points you transfer to your private account are
automatically calculated as the diﬀerence of the 17 points and the points you
transferred to the project. After every group member has made a decision,
the payoﬀ for this period is calculated.
At the end of each period, you will receive the following information:
∙ The number of points that each member in your group transferred
to the project (Please note that the numbers of points are listed in
random order, i.e. the sequence of transfers is diﬀerent in each period.)
∙ Your payoﬀ from the private account
∙ Your payoﬀ from the project
∙ Your payoﬀ from the period
∙ Your total payoﬀ from all previous periods in this phase
Then, the next period will start. In the second period, you will be shown
a table (like the one below) with the following information for all previous
22[The information in parentheses was not given in the No-info treatment but was
given in the Part-info and Full-info treatments.]
23[This was the factor for H -types. L-types had a factor of 1.33.]
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periods: your transfer to the group project, your payoﬀ in a period, and
transfers made by the other 5 members of your group [with the information
about their individual factors (H for 3.99 and L for 1.33)].24 For each period,
the transfers of group members are presented in random order, so columns
showing the contributions of the other 5 group members will not correspond
to the same person for all periods.
Transfer to the joint project
You Other group members
[H] [H] [L] [L] [L]24
Period 1 2 3 4 5 Payoﬀ
1 ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
In total, you will interact over 15 periods in each phase. You will receive
more detailed information on phase 2 after phase 1 ends.
We will ask you to complete a questionnaire after the experiment is com-
pleted. At the end of the experiment, your ﬁnal payoﬀ will be converted
into Euros and paid to you immediately. Please remain seated until we call
the number of your computer.
Thank you very much for your participation!
B Marginal eﬀects of information and of produc-
tivity types
Marginal eﬀects are calculated as the diﬀerence between the expected pro-
portion of contribution for two realizations of a variable of interest.
For example, the eﬀect of productivity on average nominal contributions
in the Full-info treatment is calculated as
Δ퐻퐿푖,푡 = 퐸(푦푖푔푡∣푥푖, 푡,퐻푖푔ℎ = 1,Part-info = 0,Full-info = 1, 푐푖) (7)
− 퐸(푦푖푔푡∣푥푖, 푡,퐻푖푔ℎ = 0,Part-info = 0,Full-info = 1, 푐푖)
where the expected contribution levels are calculated using the parameter
estimates of the model in eq. (4) to compute 푦★푖푔푡 and applying the censoring
24[Only participants in the Full-info treatment received the information allowing them
to link a contribution to the contributor’s type.]
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rule in eq. (5) to obtain 푦푖푔푡. We computed the eﬀect in eq. (7) for all
individuals who participated in the Full-info treatment and for each time
period. We average over all individual eﬀects 1/(푁푇 )
∑
∀푡,푖Δ
퐻퐿
푖,푡 to obtain
the total eﬀect. The variance of the marginal eﬀects, that was used to
calculate the 푡-values is simulated using 100 Halton draws (see Train (2003)
and Judd (1999)).25
C Parameter estimates of background character-
istics and time trend
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2
Variable Parameter Coeﬃcient T-value Coeﬃcient T-value
Age 훽1 -0.009 -6.022 -0.009 -6.006
Gender 훽2 -0.235 -19.973 -0.235 -19.754
Norm obedience 훽3 -0.044 -14.318 -0.044 -14.164
Time dummies 훿2 0.147 0.934
훿3 0.204 1.506
훿4 0.180 1.367
훿5 0.131 1.096
훿6 0.090 0.790
훿7 0.034 0.303
훿8 0.067 0.526
훿9 0.054 0.457
훿10 -0.044 -0.389
훿11 -0.048 -0.431
훿12 -0.118 -0.971
훿13 -0.146 -1.383
훿14 -0.225 -2.167
훿15 -0.411 -3.784
Table 3: Parameter estimates of background characteristics and, for speci-
ﬁcation 1, the time trend
25We discarded the ﬁrst 50 draws of a sequence, using draws 51-150.
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